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Abstract.
We present the implementation of Grover’s algorithm in a quantum simulator to per-
form a quantum search for preimages of two scaled hash functions, whose design only
uses modular addition, word rotation, and bitwise exclusive or. Our implementation
provides the means to assess with precision the scaling of the number of gates and
depth of a full-fledged quantum circuit designed to find the preimages of a given hash
digest. The detailed construction of the quantum oracle shows that the presence of
AND gates, OR gates, shifts of bits and the reuse of the initial state along the compu-
tation, require extra quantum resources as compared with other hash functions based
on modular additions, XOR gates and rotations. We also track the entanglement
entropy present in the quantum register at every step along the computation, showing
that it becomes maximal at the inner core of the first action of the quantum oracle,
which implies that no classical simulation based on Tensor Networks would be of
relevance. Finally, we show that strategies that suggest a shortcut based on sampling
the quantum register after a few steps of Grover’s algorithm can only provide some
marginal practical advantage in terms of error mitigation.
Keywords: Quantum implementation · Grover’s algorithm · Symmetric cryptography
1 Introduction
Cryptography is universally used to protect the security - confidentiality and integrity -
of communications and stored data. As it is common in the information security world,
the security of a cryptographic scheme is measured by the computational cost required to
recover the secret or the plaintext of the communication. For many years, the computational
complexity was evaluated in terms of computer instructions required to run an algorithm
that solves this problem. However, this paradigm has totally changed due to the fact that
the technology on the quantum computers side has evolved up to a point in which they
could be a reality in the next years.
The main threat that the existence of large enough quantum computers poses to
cryptography is that, nowadays, all public key schemes that are standardized and massively
used in our communications will be insecure due to Shor’s algorithm [Sho97]. An attacker
could store the communications of today and decrypt them once he has a quantum computer
with the required resources. In order to address this problem, the cryptographic community
started designing quantum resistant schemes capable of sharing symmetric keys due to
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2 Quantum Search for Scaled Hash Function Preimages
the robustness of these schemes against quantum attacks (i.e. so-called post-quantum
cryptography).
Symmetric cryptographic primitives, such as hash functions, are believed to be quantum
resistant. The security of hash functions is measured in terms of resistance against collision
finding, preimage and second preimage finding, and their multi-target variants. For an
ideal cryptographic hash function providing n-bit security, the classical complexity of
preimage and second preimage finding is 2n expected oracle calls, while for collision finding
is 2n/2 due to the birthday paradox. For these, the parallel rho method [vOW94] can offer
lower complexities if it is parallelized with a large amount of processors. For multi-target
preimage search, the cost is 2n−t hash outputs, where 2t is the number of targets.
However, if the attacker had access to a quantum computer, the best algorithm for
finding a preimage would be Grover’s algorithm [Gro96] with complexity 2n/2 quantum
evaluations. Some more specific applications of this algorithm can be used in order to
find collisions [BHT16] with complexity 2n/3 quantum evaluations. Finally, for multi-
target preimage the cost is 2(n−t)/2 quantum evaluations and all of them can also be
parallelized [BB17]. This improvement is relevant in terms of impact on the parameters for
hash functions and symmetric encryption, but it is not as disruptive as Shor’s algorithm
for prime factorization and discrete logarithms.
Given that Grover’s algorithm only provides at most a quadratic speed-up, the generally
accepted approach to make symmetric ciphers or hash functions quantum resistant is
to double their classical security level. This only gives a rough idea of the security
penalties that quantum computers cause on symmetric primitives, especially because the
cost of evaluating Grover’s oracle is very often ignored. Both cryptosystem designers and
cryptanalysts may want to know the specific parameters that provide appropriate security,
and to achieve that, further detailed studies are required to better understand the actual
cost of quantum algorithms.
When speaking about complexity in the quantum setting, there are different assumptions
related to the challenges of quantum technology. As in the classical computational model,
we have a definition of complexity, with regards to the amount of operations, which helps
the community in setting bounds on the computational cost of running a specific algorithm
that breaks the security of a scheme. Nevertheless, the quantum setting also presents
restrictions for a quantum circuit that describes an algorithm in terms of the number of
qubits (i.e. width) and the time that it runs (i.e. depth), the latter as a result of the finite
coherence time of physical qubits. For instance, an attacker can have a quantum computer
but not with enough qubits to run an algorithm. Working with large quantum circuits
presents challenges in terms of handling the complexity of the states, the demand in energy
and/or qubit decoherence. Take into consideration that, as of now, the largest quantum
computer is of 53 qubits [AAB+19] and that this figure is increasing slowly, therefore, this
measure serves as a sort of technological complexity metric.
2 Related work
NIST, in its Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process for asymmet-
ric cryptographic primitives [NIS16], suggests an approach where quantum attacks are
restricted to a fixed running time, or quantum circuit depth, by a parameter named
MAXDEPTH [NIS16], which NIST considers to be the total amount of quantum computations
possible during the full attack even in the case of error-free computations. Besides, this
restriction might as well be motivated by the difficulty of running long serial computations
on a quantum computer due to decoherence.
The restrictions from NIST motivated the need to provide better estimations of the
number of quantum gates required to break either AES or SHA3. The security categories in
the NIST PQC standardization process are defined based on the concrete cost of quantum
Ramos-Calderer et al. 3
resources in an exhaustive key search against AES and collision search as described
in [GLRS16]. In [GLRS16], the authors aim at minimizing the circuit width (i.e. the
number of qubits needed) when using Grover to break AES. Later on, the total number
of Toffoli gates of the quantum circuit for AES-128 is reduced in [ASAM18]. In parallel,
in [KHJ18], the time-space trade-offs for key search on block ciphers are discussed. They
also consider NIST’s MAXDEPTH and propose parallelization strategies for Grover’s algorithm
to address the depth constraint. Following this research line, a different S-box design is
proposed in [LPS20] to reduce the total number of Toffoli gates in the S-box as well as
its Toffoli depth for AES, improving the previous results of [GLRS16] and [ASAM18].
In [BNS19], a new framework mostly focused in AES to study quantum attacks is presented.
The authors explore the different techniques used in classical cryptanalysis and how they
can be sped up using quantum computers.
Recently, other symmetric primitives apart from AES have been considered. In [Sch20]
an implementation of Gimli is described with the particularity that it is conducted in-place
(i.e. not using any ancillary registers), by taking a bit-by-bit approach and as a result of
the underlying Gimli design which conducts XOR operations after performing ANDs and
ORs. SIMON and SPECK have also been studied with the aim of providing quantum
resource estimates in [AMM20] and [JCKS20], respectively. In addition, in [AMM20] a
reduced version of SIMON was designed with the aim of verifying the implementation via
quantum simulations.
Generic quantum cryptanalysis has also been proposed in the last years focusing on
different constructions [Kap14,KLLN16,CNS17]. Most of the works are purely theoretical
due to the lack of a powerful enough quantum computer where an algorithm can be run
to perform adequate measurements. Nevertheless, several simulation tools have recently
been presented and could shed some light on the cost of running quantum algorithms.
An implementation of the full Grover’s oracle for key search on AES and LowMC in Q#
appeared in [JNRV20]. They offer a specific implementation that allows them to be more
precise with the estimates of the resources that would be required to run the algorithm on
a quantum computer. Besides, they also review the parallelization strategies to overcome
the MAXDEPTH constraint from NIST, and conclude that it is advantageous. Finally, they
propose a circuit minimizing the (a) gate-count and (b) depth-times-width cost metrics,
under a depth constraint MAXDEPTH. It is important to note that their simulation never
runs the full algorithm, but only parts of it, and thus they are capable of testing only
small components of their implementation and claim its overall correctness.
2.1 Our contribution
Following the idea from [JNRV20,AMM20] that experimental implementation gives a
different and complementary view than a pure theoretical analysis, on quantum attacks
complexity, we study the implementation of Grover’s algorithm to find preimages of hash
functions based on modular Addition, word Rotation, and eXclusive or (ARX) operations.
Given the limitations to simulate large quantum computers, in this work we consider
two ARX-based scaled hash functions with the objective of being able to verify our results.
The first uses a Sponge structure [GJMG11], using as permutation a scaled down version of
ChaCha20 stream cipher internal permutation [Ber08] (for ChaCha12 permutation usages
see for instance [BHH+15]). The second is a scaled down version of the popular BLAKE2
hash function [AMPH14].
We provide an implementation for both scaled hash functions, as well as Grover’s
algorithm, which allows us to provide precise quantum security bounds for the equivalent
non-scaled hash functions, in terms of qubits and quantum gates required to find preimages.
Moreover, we study the behaviour of the algorithm running on a simulated quantum com-
puter in order to motivate different approaches in cryptanalysis using Grover’s algorithm.
In this context, we observe that there exists a trade-off to find preimages without having
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to run all the steps of Grover’s algorithm, at the cost of increasing the probability of
obtaining an incorrect preimage. This approach, introduced in [BBHT98], can also be
used to obtain a solution when the number of preimages is unknown.
Furthermore, our work provides insights to better understand what type of operations
require a higher amount of quantum resources. We infer that there are specific permutation
constructions that have a higher impact on the complexity of the quantum circuit.
The structure of this article reflects the methodology followed in this work. In section 3,
we describe the scaled hash functions that we implement, and motivate the choice for such
constructions. Next, in section 4 and section 5, we explain our implementation of the
quantum algorithm to break the two scaled hash functions. Finally, section 6 and section 7
are for presenting the results of our experiments and the conclusions of this work.
3 Toy hash functions
In order to have a better understanding of cryptanalytic attacks, it is a common practice
to define scaled, or toy, versions of a cryptographic primitive preserving the same security
properties, e.g. as in [MSW03], and then run the attack on this toy primitive. This is
also true for asymmetric cryptography, where, to estimate the actual difficulty of solving
a problem, e.g. factoring, researchers try to solve the largest possible instances of that
problem and accordingly extrapolate to measure the actual hardness of the larger problem.
In this work, we implement Grover’s search algorithm on a simulator of a quantum
computer, in order to understand what are the challenges of such an implementation. In
particular, we use Grover’s algorithm to find all possible preimages (with size up to the
input block) of a hash function. Due to the currently limited number of qubits that can be
simulated on classic computers, it is particularly hard to implement any real cryptographic
primitive using a quantum computer simulator. Therefore, we consider a scaled version of
a hash function, preserving the original design choices. Among all possible hash designs
available, we select the ones that seem easier to scale and fit in the simulator. In particular,
we try to avoid AND gates and OR gates as they require additional qubits and can easily
increase the qubit count over the maximum threshold that the simulator can deal with (see
also section 4.2). Therefore, we focus on primitives using only modular Addition, bitwise
Rotation and bitwise eXclusive or operations. This type of primitives are usually referred
to as ARX.
In section 3.1, we describe a toy hash function, referred to as Toy Sponge Hash in
this article, based on the Sponge construction with an iterated permutation [GJMG11,
Chapter 8]. In section 3.2, we describe a toy version of the popular BLAKE2 hash
function [AMPH14,SA15], which we refer to as Toy BLAKE Hash.
3.1 Toy Sponge Hash
A Sponge function [GJMG11] is a very flexible and elegant cryptographic design, from
which it is possible to derive several cryptographic primitives, including hash functions.
The security of a Sponge function is based on the security of an internal function, which
is often selected as an iterated permutation Π. In fig. 1a we show the diagram of a
Sponge-based cryptographic hash. During the absorbing phase, the message is split in n
blocks m0, . . . ,mn−1 of size r, the rate of the Sponge, and xored with the Sponge state
of size r + c, where c is called the capacity of the Sponge. Note that r + c is also the
input/output size of the permutation Π. The state is initialized to a fixed public value for
the first iteration. Once the message blocks are all injected into the Sponge, the squeezing
phase starts, producing as many output blocks, h0, h1, . . . of size r, as needed to reach the
hash digest size.
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Figure 1: Sponge hash constructions based on the permutation Π.
As a first experiment, we implement a simple ARX permutation, whose design is
derived from the internal permutation used in ChaCha20 stream cipher [Ber08]. The
state of ChaCha20 internal permutation is seen as a 4x4 matrix of 32 bits words. This
permutation is obtained by iterating a certain number of rounds. Each round alternatively
acts on the columns and on the diagonals of the state, by applying a function usually
referred to as the Quarter Round (QR). Since our quantum simulator can only manage a
16 bit state, we define Toy Sponge Hash, whose state is a 2x2 matrix of 4 bit words, and
define the QR function to accept two input words and return two output words (instead of
four), as shown below:
QR(a, b) :
a = a+ b
b = (b⊕ a)≪ 2
a = a+ b
b = (b⊕ a)≪ 1
return a, b
ColQR(v) :
# update columns
v[0], v[2] = QR(v[0], v[2])
v[1], v[3] = QR(v[1], v[3])
return v
DiagQR(v) :
# update diagonals
v[0], v[3] = QR(v[0], v[3])
v[1], v[2] = QR(v[1], v[2])
return v
where ColQR and DiagQR describe how QR is applied to the columns and diagonals of the
state, respectively.
To simplify the quantum simulation, we assume that the absorption of an 8 bit message
and the squeezing of a 4 to 8 bit hash output is performed in a single iteration of the
internal permutation, as shown in fig. 1b. This means the rate r of Toy Sponge Hash is 8
bits and the capacity c is also 8 bits. We will use ChaChapi to indicate the permutation
used in Toy Sponge Hash.
3.2 Toy BLAKE Hash
BLAKE2 [AMPH14, SA15] is an ARX cryptographic hash function designed to have
the best performances on software implementations. Its core permutation is a tweak of
ChaCha20 stream cipher permutation [Ber08]. To produce a message digest, a message
is split in n blocks d0, . . . , dn−1, consisting of 4x4 matrices of 64 (or 32) bit words. Each
block is input into a compression function F together with an 8 words state h, which is
then updated by F . The compression function F initializes a 4x4 matrix v using h and a
public initialization vector iv. Then, for ρ rounds, F acts first on the columns and then
on the diagonals of v, by applying a mixing function G, which also accepts a permutation
of the current block as input. The hash function BLAKE and its compression function F
are depicted in fig. 2a.
To derive Toy BLAKE Hash, the scaled version of BLAKE2, we reduce the word size
to 4 bits, and the message blocks are represented as 2x2 matrices with 4 bit words entries,
as shown in fig. 2b. The values h, iv, and v are initialized as follows:
iv[0] = 0x8, iv[1] = 0xB, h[0] = (iv[0]⊕ 0x2), h[1] = iv[1], v[0] = h[0]⊕, v[1] = h[1]⊕(t
4), v[2] = iv[0], v[3] = iv[1] and for the last round all bits are inverted, i.e. v[2] = v[2]. The
variable t identifies the current 2x2 block that is being processed, and v is initialized every
time a round begins.
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Figure 2: BLAKE2 structure.
Finally, the internal mixing function G of the Toy BLAKE Hash quarter round is
defined as follows:
G(a, b, x, y) :
a = a+ b+ x
b = (b⊕ a)≫ 2
a = a+ b+ y
b = (b⊕ a)≫ 1
return a, b
ColQR(v, d) :
# update columns
v[0], v[2] = G(v[0], v[2], d[s[0]], d[s[1]])
v[1], v[3] = G(v[1], v[3], d[s[2]], d[s[3]])
return v
DiagQR(v, d) :
# update diagonals
v[0], v[3] = G(v[0], v[3], d[s[0]], d[s[1]])
v[1], v[2] = G(v[1], v[2], d[s[2]], d[s[3]])
return v
where ColQR and DiagQR describe how G is applied to the columns and diagonals of the
state, respectively.
4 Quantum attack on Toy Sponge Hash
In order to design a quantum attack on the Toy Sponge Hash construction described in
section 3.1, we need to construct an explicit quantum circuit that implements Grover’s
search algorithm [Gro96]. This requires coding an oracle that performs the ChaChapi as well
as the different sponge phases using quantum gates, which are reversible by nature. Our
quantum algorithm is developed using the Qibo quantum simulation language, available
in [ERCBP+20], and code to reproduce the examples presented in what follows can be
found on Github [RC20].
A real Sponge-based hash function might require several rounds of squeezing to output
the digest with the expected length. In such a case, the preimage would be obtained
as a backwards sequence of quantum attacks, finding preimages of preimages. Here we
concentrate on the quantum algorithm for a single step in such a strategy. Solving a
Sponge-based hash function in one shot would require quantum resources to store the full
message and depth to accommodate all steps at once, therefore not feasible in the near
term.
Next, we present the overall structure of the quantum circuit designed to attack Toy
Sponge Hash, and then proceed to detail its sub-parts.
4.1 Grover’s algorithm for finding preimages
Grover’s search algorithm [Gro96] can be adapted to find the preimage of a hash with
2n/2 evaluations of a quantum oracle plus a diffusion operator. The specific hash function
chosen must be coded onto the quantum oracle.
The key idea behind the quantum advantage of this approach is that a quantum oracle
can process calls of superposed states, hence exploiting the genuine quantum properties of
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Figure 3: Scheme of a quantum circuit that would find preimages of a known hash function.
The oracle must encode the Toy Sponge Hash operations and flip the sign of the preimages
which are searched. Each quantum wire represented in the figure corresponds to two qubits
in the Toy Sponge Hash implementation. The qubit register m encodes the message, c is a
classical register and a marks the Grover ancilla. The diffusion part produces the inversion
over the average. The dashed box of the circuit has to be repeated O
Ä√
N/M
ä
times,
where N = 2n is the full message space and M is the number of preimages, in order to
find a preimage with probability close to 1.
entanglement and interference. It may be argued that quantum mechanics allows to try all
possible preimages in parallel at a time, but needs a way to single out the desired solution.
This task is non-trivial as the description of the states remains probabilistic. A high-level
understanding of the workings of Grover’s algorithm comes down to the appreciation that
probability amplitudes for each possible solution can add and subtract (in general, with
arbitrary relative phases). It is the fact that probability amplitudes can cancel that allows
for the suppression of undesired solutions while the probability of success is enhanced
beyond classical means.
Let us be more precise and specify the principal elements in Grover’s algorithm, namely
the initialization, the oracle and the diffusion operator.
We first need to initialize the quantum register with a quantum superposition of all
possible states. This is a standard step for many quantum algorithms which is achieved by
applying a Hadamard gate for each qubit in the quantum register. Note that this first
step is genuinely quantum, as the register will then handle the equal superposition of all
possible states.
We then apply an oracle that encodes the action of the hash function. This oracle
changes the sign of the states that satisfy a given condition. We here choose to change the
sign of the hash preimage we want to unveil. Therefore, the oracle will receive all possible
preimages on superposition, will compute their hash on a single go and then detect the
one we want to invert. It will then be possible to change the sign of the correct preimage
in the superposition and undo the hash by applying the circuit in reverse. This means the
oracle will include the information of the particular output we are analyzing.
After the action of the oracle, a diffusion operator is applied. This final element is
constructed so as to produce an inversion of all probability amplitudes with respect to
their average. The effect of the oracle plus diffusion amplifies the probability of measuring
one of the solution states by a small quantity. The oracle and diffusion steps must be
iterated to bring the probability of finding the right preimage close to 1.
We reiterate here the logic of the Grover attack on a hash function. Starting from
equal probability amplitudes for all states, the action of an oracle, that we shall label here
as "Sponge Oracle", inverts the sign for the preimage solution to Toy Sponge Hash. This
still remains a small probability amplitude. In the diffusion step, the inverse about the
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(b) Quantum circuit example for the adder mod-
ulo 2n between two 4 qubit register using a single
ancilla qubit. This is the circuit that performs
the addition part of the quantum implementa-
tion of QR.
Figure 4: Quantum circuits for the Quarter Round and the adder module 2n.
average produces an amplification of the probability amplitude associated to the solutions
we are after. If a series of two-step oracle plus diffusion actions are applied O(2n/2) times,
a solution of the problem is found with near 1 probability.
The approach we have just sketched can be applied to search for preimages of a hash
function. A diagram of the structure of Grover’s algorithm to solve the Toy Sponge Hash
model is shown in Figure 3.
The simplicity of Grover’s overall structure disappears when this algorithm is translated
into a series of quantum gates to be run on a real device. Hence, the explicit coding of
Grover’s recipe needs to be done efficiently in order not to hinder its promised quadratic
performance improvement. A detailed discussion of the creation of the oracle to solve this
toy model will now follow.
4.2 Quantum circuit for Toy Sponge Hash permutation
The base of the ChaChapi permutation is the QR module outlined in section 3.1. The first
step in building the needed quantum Sponge Oracle is to reproduce the Quarter Round
algorithm on a quantum computer. As sketched in fig. 4a there are three operations in QR:
an addition modulo 2n, a bitwise XOR operation and an n-bit word rotation. In terms of
explicit quantum operations, the addition is the one that incurs most of the computational
cost. A bitwise XOR can be achieved in a reversible manner using controlled-not (CNOT)
gates and the rotation can be understood as a classical qubit relabelling and does not add
any quantum cost.
The explicit circuit design of ARX based hash functions highlights some of the issues
one might face when translating a classical permutation into a reversible quantum language.
As previously stated, XOR operations can be substituted by a CNOT gate, reversible due
to its quantum nature. That, however is not the case for the AND and OR classical gates,
as they require additional quantum resources to be added into the circuit in order to be
reversible. A similar thing happens with bit shifts. While rotations can be substituted by
qubit relabeling, shifts are innately destructive, therefore non-reversible, and could also
need the addition of auxiliary quantum registers. The modular addition might be costly,
but the ancilla qubits required to keep track of the carry bits can ultimately be decoupled
from the system.
The Quarter Round circuit we have designed makes use of an addition modulo 2n.
This element can be constructed using a regular quantum adder without computing
overflow qubits. Quantum adders have been previously studied and different algorithms
are available [VBE96,CDKM04,DKRS04] with different depth and qubit requirements.
For the purpose of this simulation we have used a modified version of the adder presented
in [CDKM04] due to the reduced amount of ancillas required. As seen in fig. 4b, the circuit
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(a) Quantum circuit that recreates the ChaChapi
permutation described in section 3.1.
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a
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(b) Sponge Oracle in the context of the Toy
Sponge Hash model described in section 3.1.
Figure 5: Quantum circuit for ChaChapi and for the Sponge Oracle
is highly parallelizable, enabling reduction of circuit depth and requiring one ancillary
qubit.
For each addition performed in parallel one extra ancillary qubit is needed. However,
as the ancilla is decoupled from the system by the end of the computation, that same
ancilla can be reused throughout the full circuit.
The described quantum Quarter Round block can then be added between the different
quantum registers as instructed by ColQR and DiagQR in order to build an operator pi
that outputs a ChaChapi permutation on the quantum registers. The construction of this
circuit is showcased in fig. 5a, where the explicit distribution of Quarter Rounds can be
seen. The Quarter Round circuits, as built in fig. 4a, are applied as dictate ColQR and
DiagQR, then repeated 10 times. In this figure, each visible quantum wire accounts for 2
quantum wires in the Toy Sponge Hash construction and are reduced for visual clarity.
Since the construction has been done using quantum gates, the operator will be reversible.
That is, applying the gates in reverse order will recover the inverse permutation.
4.2.1 Full oracle.
The full oracle we need to implement consists of three parts. 1) The first permutation,
constructed classically as it does not include the message, has to be XOR-ed to the
messages in superposition. 2) Then the previously described permutation is applied, and a
multi-CNOT gate with controls matching the desired hash value acts on the output of
the permutation and the ancilla. This step changes the sign of the quantum state that
encodes the desired hash. 3) After that, the permutation is inverted in order to return
to the original message space. Note that applying the permutation circuit in reverse
order achieves the inverse permutation. At the end of the oracle action, all messages that
output the same hash value have their amplitude sign inverted. Shown in fig. 5b is the
construction of the full Sponge Oracle using the previously described circuits. This explicit
circuit construction inverts the sign of all messages that output the same hash function in
the context of the Toy Sponge Hash model described in section 3.1. The pi operator is the
quantum version of the ChaChapi permutation. The c wire denotes a static classical channel
that determines the position of some gates, m refers to the qubit register that encodes
the message and a labels the Grover ancilla. The hash value checked in this particular
example would be 10011010, this is determined by the controls in the multi-controlled
NOT gate in the center.
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Diffusion =
H X H H X H
H X • X H
H X • X H
H X • X H
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Figure 6: Explicit circuit construction that computes the inversion about the average
on the quantum registers that encodes the superposition of all possible messages. This
amplifies the amplitude of the correct answers.
4.2.2 Diffusion operator.
The explicit construction of the diffusion operator is common to all Grover implementations
[Gro96]. The role of this operator is to perform the inversion about the average once
the states that codify the solutions of the problem have had the sign of their amplitude
changed. The quantum circuit that achieves this is shown in fig. 6. In this case, the
diffusion operator only needs to be applied to the message registers of the quantum circuit
as they are the only ones that are started in a superposition, in the proposed Toy Sponge
Hash this accounts for 8 qubits. The diffusion operator corresponds to a matrix D whose
elements are
Dij =
2
N
if i 6= j and Dii = −1 + 2
N
, (1)
where N = 2n.
Both the oracle and the diffusion operator contain multi-CNOT gates that need to be
decomposed into elementary gates in order to faithfully asses the full complexity of the
circuit. Different methods in which multi-controlled gates can be decomposed in terms
of CNOT and Toffoli gates are outlined and given their basic gate scaling in [BBC+95].
Some of the most efficient constructions can only be performed in the case of having a
circuit with some extra work qubits.
A multi-CNOT gate can be decomposed, see fig. 7, with linear efficiency into Toffoli
gates using one extra qubit. There are in fact several unused qubits in the circuit when
the multi-CNOT gates have to be applied, but in order to keep it separate from the qubits
encoding the solutions, we shall use the ancillary qubit introduced in the addition modulo
2n circuit as the work qubit for these construction.
4.2.3 Full Grover step.
The Sponge Oracle and the diffusion operator combined to produce the body of a single
Grover step and its full construction can be seen in fig. 8. The full quantum circuit will
require a series of O
Ä√
N/M
ä
Grover steps, where N = 2n is the search space, and M is
the number of solutions, that is, preimages with the same hash value.
With the full Grover step constructed, preimages of Toy Sponge Hash can be obtained.
This can be done directly if the number of preimages is known, applying the Grover step
∼ pi4
√
2n/M times, with M the total number of preimages. If that is not the case, this
construction can be first employed in quantum counting algorithms in order to obtain the
total number of preimages, following the guidelines illustrated in [BBHT98].
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(a) Multi-CNOT gate using an ex-
tra qubit
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(b) Multi-CNOT gate using extra work space.
Figure 7: Decomposition of multi-CNOT gates into basic Toffoli gates using a single extra
work qubit. The extra qubit needs not be initialized at |0〉. Note that ancillas already
required for the addition can be reused here. In Figure (a), the decomposition of the
multi-CNOT gate with one work qubit into smaller gates is shown. In Figure (b), the full
decomposition of the resulting gates is shown using enough work space so that they can
be reduced to Toffoli gates.
c • •
pi pi−1 · · ·H • H X H H X H
H H X • X H
H H X • X H
H • H X • X H
H • H X • X H
H H X • X H
H • H X • X H
H H X • X H

m
a X H
repeat O
Ä√
N/M
ä
times
Figure 8: Explicit circuit construction that performs Grover’s search algorithm in order to
find preimages for a certain known Hash function following the Toy Sponge Hash model
described in section 3.1. The label c denotes an auxiliary classical register, a is the Grover
ancilla, and m labels the qubit register that encodes the message. The dashed section of
the circuit has to be repeated O
Ä√
N/M
ä
times, where N = 2n is the message space and
M is the number of preimages, in order to complete the algorithm.
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4.3 Unknown number of preimages.
Alternatively, as shown in [BBHT98] as well, this Grover step can be employed in an
iterative algorithm to find a preimage even with an unknown number of solutions in the
same order of complexity, that is O
Ä√
2n/M
ä
oracle calls. The algorithm assumes that
the number of possible solutions is less than 3N/4, where N is the message space, which
holds for hash functions as the number of preimages is small by construction.
The algorithm presented is as follows. First we initialize m = 1 and λ = 6/5, as
described in [BBHT98] any λ between 1 and 4/3 would work. Then, a value j is chosen
randomly between the non-negative integers smaller than m and Grover’s search algorithm
is applied with j steps. If the measured outcome is a solution of the problem, the algorithm
ends. If that is not the case, we set m = min(λm,
√
N) and repeat the previous step.
The success of this algorithm is not guaranteed in a set amount of steps unlike the
regular Grover procedure. Nevertheless, the original paper proves that when the number
of solutions is much lower than the total space, the number of Grover iterations is upper-
bounded by 94
√
N/M , where M is the number of solutions. The prefactor is larger, but
even in the worst case, the overall scaling is still the same. However, the average number
of function calls needed to solve the algorithm is much closer to the optimal scaling. In
Sec. 6 we present average values of the iterations needed according to simulation.
4.4 Scaling.
The explicit implementation of a toy example of a preimage searching algorithm using
Grover’s strategy can be used to extrapolate the scaling of said algorithm for real imple-
mentations. Let us first state that the quantum circuit is made of many subparts that
may be implemented in some more efficient way in the future. In spite of that, it will not
modify the complexity class of the problem.
By taking into account the scaling of each individual component of the circuit one can
infer the full scaling of the circuit with regards to the size of the hash function used. The
number of TOFFOLI, CNOT and SINGLE qubit gates required to build a Grover step for
the Toy Sponge Hash model are
#TOFFOLI: 88n− 80s− 88, #CNOT: 240n− 160s, #SINGLE: 84n− 160s+ 2, (2)
where n is the total number of bits involved and s is the number of sites in the permutation
matrix. This scaling agrees with the construction of the full circuit in the code provided.
Hash-specific alterations might add or subtract constants to these numbers but not in a
significant way. The required depth of the algorithm turns out to be
depth =
Å120√
s
+ 8
ã
n− 120√s− 80. (3)
This scaling benefits from the reduced depth of the addition and the fact that components
of the circuit that act on different qubit registers can be applied at the same time.
Using the scaling we find for our Toy Sponge Hash, it is possible to infer the amount of
gates the algorithm would require to solve the same problem using the real permutation.
In table 1 the scaling of both the TOY model and REAL implementation is outlined.
This can be checked against the code provided [RC20] for the example using real life values
for the Sponge Hash construction.
This scaling of the basic Grover step has to be understood as the cost attached to the√
2n/M oracle calls that the algorithms requires. The efficient construction of the oracle
with the number of qubits signals that the overall scaling will not be altered, but it is a
factor that has to be considered.
Some depth reduction can be achieved by implementing parts of the circuit that act on
different sites of the permutation matrix at the same time. This has the cost of adding
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Table 1: Scaling of a single Grover step for the TOY and REAL model of preimage search
based on the Sponge Hash using ChaCha20 permutation, as programmed in the algorithm
presented above. The depth of the circuit is significantly lower than the total number
of gates due to the possibility of applying quantum gates to different qubits in parallel.
For the REAL implementation of the algorithm the depth reduction is increased when
compared to the total gates since the larger permutation matrix allows for further parallel
application of adder gates. This, however, would require a different ancillary qubit for
each parallel adder circuit.
#TOFFOLI #CNOT #SINGLE #TOTAL depth
TOY n = 16 s = 4 1000 3200 706 4906 1248
REAL n = 512 s = 16 43688 120320 40450 204458 19856
√
s ancillas for each adder modulo 2n that can be implemented simultaneously. The extra
qubits needed, however, are not significant when compared to the overall qubit complexity.
In order to achieve the target circuit depth the number of qubits needed for both the TOY
and REAL hash application are
nTOY = 19 qubits, nREAL = 517 qubits. (4)
The ancillary qubits needed for full depth reduction only account for less than a 1%
increase in the total size of the circuit for the real implementation.
5 Quantum Toy BLAKE Hash construction
The preimage finding algorithm for the more complex Toy BLAKE Hash construction,
described in section 3.2 follows the same basic outlines as the ones described for the Toy
Sponge Hash model. In this case, since the message is used inside the Toy BLAKE Hash
compression function, it has to be kept in a separate register than the permutation matrix
v. This causes the amount of qubits needed to increase when compared to Toy Sponge
Hash. In spite of that, Grover’s search algorithm follows as previously described, with the
diffusion operator acting exclusively on the message space.
The internal mixing function for the Toy BLAKE Hash implementation as a reversible
quantum circuit is showcased in fig. 9. The basic parts that make up this function are the
same as for the ChaChapi Quarter Round, but here there is the contribution from registers
x and y, which are part of the message.
G
y x a b
=
Adder mod 2n
y
Adder mod 2n
x
Adder mod 2n
•
Adder mod 2n
•
• •
a
	 	
b
Figure 9: Quantum circuit analog of operator G presented in section 3.2. Each presented
wire corresponds to two quantum wires in the toy construction, and any CNOT gate
between wires is understood to carry onto omitted wires. The adder mod 2n gates are
equivalent to the ones presented in fig. 4b. In all instances, the register a is the one
updated with the addition result.
The compression function that is seen in fig. 2a can be built as a reversible quantum
circuit for Grover’s oracle using as many qubits as bits in the message matrix d and vector
v. A single ancillary qubit, or two if further parallelization is desired, is needed for the
addition modulo 2n circuits and it can then be reused throughout the repetition of the G
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d[2]
d[3]
v[0]
v[1]
v[2]
v[3]
=
c • •
d[0]
	
G G
d[1]
d[2]
G G
d[3]
v[0] h[0]
v[1] h[1]
v[2] •
v[3] •
repeat ρ times
Figure 10: Quantum circuit that implements Toy BLAKE Hash compression function as is
outlined in fig. 2b. The initialization step is performed classically and stored in a classical
register c along with the value of iv as they are used as classical controls for the quantum
circuit. The shuffling in the message space translates to a qubit relabelling and does not
incur any quantum gates. Each visible quantum wire in the figure accounts for 4 qubits in
the toy implementation. The hash value is returned in the v[0] and v[1] registers.
function operators. The first step of vector v can be initialized classically, as it is fully
determined by the initial parameters of the system, and stored in a classical register to act
as classical controls later on in the system. The permutation of the message matrix can be
achieved through a qubit relabeling and thus does not add more gates. In fig. 10 a sketch
of the circuit is shown. In the figure, each quantum wire represents a quantum register of
4 different qubits and the gates are understood to act equally on all of them.
Once the compression function is built, an oracle can be constructed to find preimages of
a specific hash for this toy construction. The explicit circuit of the Grover implementation
can be seen in fig. 11, with quantum wires labeled d and v representing quantum registers
of 4 qubits. Accounting for the extra registers, the construction is identical to the one
showcased for the Toy Sponge Hash model in the previous section. The diffusion operator
is constructed in the same way as depicted in fig. 6, accounting for circuit size differences
so as to match an operator with the elements described in eq. (1). The amount of qubits
c
Blake2 Blake2−1
d[0] H
Diffusion
· · ·
d[1] H
d[2] H
d[3] H
v[0] •
v[1] •
v[2]
v[3]
a X H
repeat O
Ä√
N/M
ä
times
Figure 11: Grover’s algorithm construction for preimage finding for Toy BLAKE Hash
presented in section 3.2. Each quantum wire labeled d and v correspond to 4 qubits
matching the description in their respective section. Labelled c is the classical register
used in the Blake2 operator. A gate acting on the quantum wire in the figure is to be
understood as acting on all qubits that it represents. The hash value is encoded into the
controls that target the Grover ancilla from registers v[0] and v[1]. The Grover step has to
be repeated O
Ä√
N/M
ä
times where N = 2n.
needed to perform the toy model of this algorithm is 32 qubits for the message and vector
registers, as well as the Grover ancilla and the required ancilla for the modular additions.
Thus, the minimum number of qubits needed to run the algorithm is 34.
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Table 2: Scaling of a single Grover step for the TOY and REAL model of preimage search
based on the BLAKE2. Both computations have been done with the same ρ = 12. To
achieve the presented depth,
√
s ancillas are needed.
#TOFFOLI #CNOT #SINGLE #TOTAL depth
TOY n = 16 s = 4 2240 6928 1650 11018 1550
REAL n = 1024 s = 16 157384 414208 150018 721610 64622
5.1 Scaling.
An explicit gate-by-gate implementation of the Grover iteration for preimage finding for
Toy BLAKE Hash has been constructed. Due to the overall size of the circuit, efficient
classical simulation is impractical. However, from the construction we have presented, the
complexity scaling can be calculated and therefore extrapolated to real implementations.
In terms of basic gates, the Grover step that has to be repeated in order to find
preimages for Toy BLAKE Hash requires the following basic gates,
#TOFFOLI: (8ρ+ 16 ρ√
s
+ 12)n− (8s+ 16√s)ρ− 56,
#CNOT: (24ρ+ 40 ρ√
s
+ 1)n− (16s+ 32√s)ρ, (5)
#SINGLE: (8ρ+ 16 ρ√
s
+ 7)n− (16s+ 32√s)ρ+ 2,
where n is the amount of bits of the message digest d, s is the total sites of the permutation
matrix, and the parameter ρ, as seen in fig. 2a, determines the amount of repetitions inside
the compression function. Hash-specific alterations might add or subtract constants to
these numbers, but not relevant to the overall scaling. The circuit can achieve a certain
level of parallelization provided
√
s ancillas are added to the circuit. Then, the depth of
the circuit becomes
depth = (12 ρ√
s
+ 16ρ
s
+ 16)n− (12√s+ 24)ρ− 50. (6)
Further detailed in table 2 are the total amount of gates required for the TOY implemen-
tation described beforehand, and for a REAL instance of 1024 bits, with 64 bit words in
the sites of the matrix. For both circuits, the amount of repetitions of the Toy BLAKE
Hash Quarter rounds has been set to ρ = 12. Again, this scaling refers to the Grover
step, oracle and diffuser included, and can be understood as the factor that accompanies
each necessary application of the Grover step in the algorithm. This can be corroborated
with the code provided [RC20] for the example using real life values for the Blake2 Hash
construction.
The qubit complexity of the Toy BLAKE Hash implementation, as briefly discussed
above, is higher than for the Toy Sponge Hash model based on the ChaChapi permutation.
This is due to the fact that the messages are actively used inside the Toy BLAKE Hash
Quarter Rounds, therefore are to be saved on their own quantum register, effectively
doubling the number of qubits required. The total amount of qubit width required to run
the presented algorithm, including the
√
s ancillas in order to achieve full parallelization
are
nTOY = 35 qubits, nREAL = 2053 qubits. (7)
The toy model is at the limit of what can be implemented by quantum simulators available,
but is within the number of qubits available in recent quantum devices.
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(a) Instance with two preimages. (b) Instance with three preimages.
Figure 12: Evolution of the probability of finding a message during the Grover process. As
more Grover steps are performed the probability of finding a preimage of the target hash
is amplified. As can be appreciated in both images, after just a portion of the required
∼ pi4
√
2n/M Grover steps, the solutions become easily noticeable.
6 Results
The explicit construction and programming of all steps in a Grover attack on Toy Sponge
Hash allows for a detailed exact simulation of the results and costs of an attack on a
hash function. In the following we will discuss the success in the finding of preimages,
according to the expected performance of the algorithm in ideal conditions, that is, without
introducing a simulation of the experimental errors which are expected. Furthermore, the
fact that we handle the exact description of the state at every step of the computation
opens the possibility to analyze the entanglement entropy which is pervading the system.
This is, in turn, makes it possible to assess the limits of an approximate simulation of a
quantum circuit using Tensor Networks. A study of the effects of Pauli errors, appearance
of random X, Y or Z gates after any gate application, is performed in order to compare
the effectiveness of running the full algorithm or a reduced version under noise conditions.
6.1 Finding preimages.
Let us first run the attack on Toy Sponge Hash using the quantum circuit we have
constructed in the previous section. The algorithm is made of a sequence of basic Grover
steps. According to the theory, even if the exact number of preimages is unknown at first,
it is necessary to apply O
Ä√
N/M
ä
Grover steps [BBHT98], where N = 2n and M is the
number of preimages, in order to find those preimages. Every Grover step will increase
the probability of the desired solution, until the maximum is obtained.
In order to visualize the iterative nature of Grover’s algorithm, we plot in fig. 12 the
probabilities of measuring the final message states for hash instances with two and three
preimages respectively, as a function of Grover steps. It can be seen that the probability
of measuring the preimages is amplified with each iteration following a sinus wave pattern
reaching its maximum at the closest integer near ∼ pi4
√
2n/M , as expected. After that
point, the probability of finding the solutions decreases as it is redistributed back to all
states. Grover’s algorithm can be understood as a rotation in the two dimensional plane
defined by a vector with the superposition of all solutions and another orthogonal vector
with the superposition of the non-solution states.
As it can be appreciated in fig. 12, there is no need to reach the full number of Grover
steps in order to already find an important amplification of the probability of measuring a
preimage state. This implies that one could stop the quantum computation before the
full scaling is reached, and extract more output samples in a way that a solution will still
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be found with high probability. Outlined in table 3 are the probabilities of a preimage
appearing after each amount of Grover steps, as well as the average number of samples
needed to find the first preimage apparition. This strategy to cut short the full quantum
computation has been analyzed for several number of preimages. It can be seen that
the optimal way to proceed in an ideal quantum computer is to finish the full Grover’s
algorithm and perform all iterations. However, if unlimited circuit depth is not available,
as is the case for Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) [Pre18] devices where gate
errors and decoherence are a relevant issue, one can strive for a set depth and still arrive
to the right solution by extracting more samples. This practical consideration may be
non-trivial in this and other applications of Grover’s search algorithm.
Table 3: Probability of success and number of average samples needed before finding one
preimage depending on the number of Grover steps performed. The average number of
total oracle calls in order to find a preimage is also presented. For different number of
preimages, the probability of measuring one of them increases according to the number
of Grover steps applied. In general, the optimal solution is to perform the full Grover’s
algorithm to find solutions. However, should circuit depth be an issue, we can stop at an
earlier step and acquire more samples for a similar result.
Number of preimages
2 4 6
Prob. First Calls Prob. First Calls Prob. First Calls
1 step 0.069 14.523 15 0.135 7.417 8 0.198 5.052 6
2 steps 0.183 5.453 11 0.344 2.908 6 0.483 2.067 5
3 steps 0.337 2.966 9 0.591 1.691 6 0.774 1.291 4
4 steps 0.511 1.956 8 0.816 1.225 5 0.965 1.036 5
5 steps 0.684 1.463 8 0.964 1.038 6 0.986 1.015 5
6 steps 0.834 1.120 8 0.997 1.003 6
7 steps 0.942 1.062 8
8 steps 0.996 1.004 8
6.2 Function calls needed for unknown number of solutions.
The implementation of Grover’s algorithm when the exact number of solutions is unknown
does not have a strict number of function calls needed to find a preimage. The algorithm
presented in [BBHT98] gives a strict upper-bound on the number of Grover steps needed.
In the following we have applied this algorithm to the Toy Sponge Hash construction
presented here in order to estimate the average amount of Oracle calls needed for instances
with different number of preimages.
Table 4: Theoretical bounds for the number of function calls needed to recover a solution in
the Toy Sponge Hash construction compared with the average calls needed in a simulation.
The average is taken after performing the algorithm 1000 times. The first value presented
is the scaling of the direct Grover algorithm, the second one is the averaged value from
simulation, and the third one is the theoretical upper bound described in [BBHT98]. It
can be seen that the average number of oracle calls needed to solve the problem is much
closer to the normal Grover scaling than to the predicted upper bound.
Number of preimages
2 4 6
Grover scaling 8 6 5
Average calls 10.0 6.3 4.7
Upper-bound 26 18 15
In Tab. 4 we present data on the average number of Oracle calls needed to recover one
preimage when the total number of solutions is not known. The average calls is obtained
after averaging over 1000 different iterations of the algorithm. As seen, the average number
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of steps remains much closer to the original Grover scaling rather than the theoretical
upper bound predicted.
6.3 Entropy obstruction to simulation by Tensor Networks.
A study of the entropy within the quantum circuit is relevant, as classical techniques are
available to simulate quantum algorithms in a most efficient manner if the entanglement
present along a quantum computation is low. As a matter of fact, the technology usually
quoted as Tensor Networks is known to achieve a faithful representation of any quantum
state with moderate entanglement.
Let us introduce the von Neumann entropy as a figure of merit to quantify entanglement
in the register |ψ〉. The way to compute the entropy of a bi-partition A−B of the system
requires to first get the reduced density matrix to half of the register ρA = TrB |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Then the von Neumann entropy for this partition is SA = −TrρA log2 ρA . This entropy is
zero in the absence of entanglement and is bounded by the size of the system nA, that
is the number of qubits in the partition. It is known that states whose von Neumann
entropy only scales logarithmically with the number of qubits can be described in terms of
Matrix Product States [Vid03]. This means the amount of entropy present in the quantum
register along the quantum circuit should be large, otherwise there would exist an efficient
attack on hash functions based on simulating Grover’s algorithm with Tensor Networks.
It is well known that the entropy present in the register along Grover’s algorithm is
bounded by 1 if measured after an application of each Grover step [OL04]. This has a
very simple explanation. At the end of a Grover step, the register is separated in two
distinct orthogonal states, the solutions and the rest. As a consequence, the maximum von
Neumann entropy between circuit bi-partitions reached its bounded by 1, corresponding
to maximum two-partite entropy. But this argument fails to understand that the heart of
the quantum computation is done within the oracle. There, the quantum register displays
an enormous increase of entropy, which is at the origin of its quantum advantage.
Let us emphasize this point further. No algorithm that does not produce large entropy
can provide any quantum advantage over classical strategies. This is due to the fact that
a low amount of entanglement can be simulated efficiently. Grover’s advantage needs to
be rooted at exploiting large entanglement in the quantum register. This, indeed, should
take place within the oracle.
A confirmation of this reasoning can be seen in fig. 13. The von Neumann entropy for
half of the register in the middle of the Grover step is closer to the maximum possible
bipartite entropy in the Toy Sponge Hash. More precisely, the entropy in the middle of
the Grover step is computed right after the Grover ancilla changes the sign of the target
hash states, at the center of the circuit shown in fig. 5b. The bi-partition used at this
point is half the quantum registers that make up the permutation matrix. For the entropy
after the Grover step, the bi-partition is instead half the quantum registers that encode
the message space, as the rest of the permutation matrix is at the |0〉 state.
In the Toy Sponge Hash quantum algorithm we have presented, a gate by gate study
of the entanglement entropy reveals that its maximum is 7.3619, regardless of the number
of preimages. This is to be compared with the theoretical maximum, 8. It is noteworthy
to observe that the maximum along the computation is reached at the first action of the
Sponge Oracle. In some way, the register develops very large correlations which are needed
to spot the solutions. Then, as the solutions are enhanced, quantum correlations need not
be that high.
The entanglement in the register along the computation depends on the number of
preimages as well as if their binary encoding is orthogonal in the respective bi-partitions.
Nevertheless, entanglement always peaks at the first application of the Sponge Oracle.
This shows that, in the case of large number of qubits n, the entropy in the register will
likely scale with n, rendering inefficient the classical alternatives for simulation of quantum
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(a) Hash: 10011101 - 1 preimage. (b) Hash: 10100011 - 2 preimages.
(c) Hash: 10000101 - 3 preimages. (d) Hash: 1110001 - 4 preimages.
Figure 13: Von Neumann entropy in the middle and after a Grover step for different
number of preimages. In this analysis, all bipartitions remain orthogonal in the final
solution state. In the case where entropy is measured after Grover step we consider the
bipartition that corresponds to half the message space. In the case where entropy is
measured in the middle of the Grover step, we consider the bi-partition of half the qubits
that correspond to the whole permutation matrix.
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circuits. Grover’s algorithm does need an actual quantum computer to support entropy
that scales as the volume of the system.
6.4 Error robustness.
The previous simulations assume access to an error free quantum device. This, however, is
not the case for actual quantum computers, still far from operating with logical qubits.
Before reaching fault-tolerant quantum computation quantum devices will be in their
NISQ stage, so considering the effects of errors in proposed algorithms is required. In the
following we analyse the effect of errors on these implementations of Grover’s algorithm
for preimage finding.
Quantum errors range from decoherence and dephasing to Pauli errors. Pauli errors are
characterized by the probability of a random Pauli effect, represented as gates X, Y and Z,
acting on any particular qubit. We have simulated the Toy Sponge Hash construction in
the presence of increasing probability of appearing an X, Y and Z gate after every quantum
gate is applied.
Figure 14: Probability of finding a preimage after applying Grover’s algorithm with the
same amount of oracle calls under increasing bitphase, or Pauli, error. A small error already
destroys most of the strength of the algorithm due to its complexity and required precision.
Points averaged over 250 instances. Running multiple instances of a reduced version of
the algorithm can result in mitigation of the error effects on Noisy Intermediate-Scale
Quantum computers. Examples run for an instance with two preimages corresponding to
hash value: 10100011.
Due to the amount of required gates for Grover’s algorithm, this toy model requires
gate precision below 0.001% in order to reliably output the correct preimages. When the
Pauli error probability reaches beyond 0.003% all results are effectively lost. In fig. 14
the probability of recovering a preimage after applying Grover’s algorithm for different
magnitudes of Pauli errors is shown. For the same amount of oracle queries, results are
presented for the full Grover implementation and one where the preimages are measured
when half the Grover steps are applied. It can be appreciated that for no error, applying
all steps, namely ∼ pi4
√
2n/M , gives better results. However, as the errors increase, the
reduced gate number of applying less Grover steps translates into an advantage when
finding preimages. For this example, the success probability doubles when at 0.001% error
probability. This balance should be taken into consideration when running this algorithm
on a real device. As the Hash construction is scaled, at least a similar ratio of error
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probability to number of required gates should be maintained, and since the number of
gates needed is much larger, the error has to go down that much as well. This leads to
the conclusion that even though performing less Grover steps yields a marginal advantage
against error, it is negligible when full size Hash constructions are considered.
7 Conclusion
Quantum algorithms specially designed to attack cryptographic protocols require extensive
perusal. We have presented an explicit quantum code that performs a full Grover attack
on two scaled ARX-based hash functions. Our algorithm is simulated using the Qibo
quantum simulation software, which is an open-source library for quantum computation
available in [ERCBP+20]. Code to reproduce the quantum circuits present in this paper
can be found in GitHub [RC20].
The explicit construction of a quantum algorithm based on Grover’s search provides an
exact quantification of the quantum resources which are needed for an actual implemen-
tation of a preimage attack. The main takeaway is that the number of gates and depth
required to build the oracle and diffusor scales linearly with n, the number of qubits in the
register, with large prefactors. This is relevant as large prefactors may make inaccurate
naive predictions for the power of quantum computation.
The results of this work further bring a number of considerations we shall now summarize:
(a) Different hash functions may differ substantially in the quantum resources needed to
attack them. The quantum algorithm to find preimages of a BLAKE2 hash requires 2053
qubits and 721610 gates for a single Grover step, while for the basic sponge construction
using ChaCha20 permutation 517 qubit and 204458 gates are required (considering a single
compression function/permutation cycle). (b) Classical gates such as AND, OR or XOR
are dealt differently at the quantum level. It turns out that XOR easily translates onto a
CNOT. But, a classical AND or OR gate is not reversible which implies proliferation of
qubits. Thus, new hash functions can be designed to be more difficult to be attacked by a
quantum Grover strategy. (c) The analysis of the entropy that the register develops shows
that entanglement is maximal during the first action of the oracle. This fact discards
the possibility of simulating the quantum algorithm using the powerful Tensor Network
classical techniques. (d) We have shown that the idea of sampling intermediate Grover
steps is proven essentially as powerful as running the whole algorithm in an ideal quantum
computer. (e) We have presented a first analysis of Pauli errors, showing the degradation
of the success probability as the probability of error increases. We have also observed that
a strategy to run part of Grover’s algorithm performs better than the full quantum circuit
because of the smaller accumulation of errors.
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